

LIGO Cybersecurity

VO security from a physicist's
perspective

Warren G. Anderson

LIGO Scientific collaboration

Securing What/Whom

Users and systems

LIGO

- Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory
- Built in the 1990s, operational since the early 2000's
- Looks for ripples in space-time from astronomical sources.
- Made first detection in Sept. 2015, announced it in Feb. 2016.

Two LIGO User Populations

- LIGO Laboratory
 - Smaller population (190 people)
 - More accountable (can be fired)
 - More likely to have access to high-value systems
 - Use systems we control
- LIGO Scientific Collaboration
 - Larger population (881)
 - Less accountable (can refuse to renew MOU)
 - Have some access to high-value systems
 - Use systems we don't control

LIGO Scientific Collaboration


86 institutions, 17 countries, 5 continents



External User Populations

- VIRGO (French-Italian project)
 - 405 people
 - Access to most systems available to LSC
 - Less accountability – no security aspect to MOU
- Other astronomers
 - A few hundred
 - No access to high value systems
 - No real accountability

Systems - Geography



Systems - Types

- Detector control and monitoring systems
 - Two sets at Livingston and Hanford Observatories
 - Access billion dollar instruments directly
- AuthN/Z systems
 - Redundant copies at all Tier 0-2 sites, centralized for Tier > 2.
- Computer clusters
 - Tier 0-2.5 sites, supply most scientific computing, allow ssh.
- Collaboration services
 - Wikis, mail servers, ssh portals, etc
- General computing
 - Laptops, workstations, etc

Premise

Maximizing science opportunity is
the overriding concern.

Risk Analysis

- Risks matrix tries to compare expected downtime from an incident vs expected loss of science from reduced usability (hard to do).
 - “Good” security measures have minimal impact on usability, or even enhance it (e.g. SSO)
- “Disgruntled insider” seen as largest potential threat.
- Risk posture and residual risks explained to and accepted by (or not) project management.

Risk Posture (Lower Risk)

- LIGO Laboratory users and systems (Tier 0-1 and Lab internal GC)
 - Training programs, network monitoring, system configuration controls, enforced patching, etc are feasible.
- LSC Compute clusters (Tier 2-2.5) and many collaboration services
 - Some admin training, weekly admin meetings discussing configuration controls, patching etc.
- Collaboration services software and systems
 - Largely widely used (MIT Kerberos, Shibboleth, OpenLDAP, Sympa, FOSWiki, Redmine, GIT, etc) or security reviewed.

Risk Posture (Higher Risk)

- Some collaboration services and most non-Lab GC
 - Managed by LSC scientists with little or no security training or by campus IT groups who have little or no understanding of LIGO trust relationships.
- Most scientific software
 - Written by LSC scientists with little or no security training and has not been reviewed for security.

Premise

VO environments have fuzzy borders,
risks are unavoidable

Risk Acceptance

- LIGO and other large science VOs must accept higher risks than many other organizations or they lose science opportunity.
- Incident detection and response are at least as important as risk mitigation.
- Understanding risk posture and accepting residual risk important for security team and management.

Incident Detection

- Possible on high value systems but ...
 - User laptops?
 - System run by member institutions?

Incident Response

- Trust relationships exist with MANY different organizations to which LIGO scientists belong.
- Clear communication and, where possible, coordinated response between external organizations and science VOs is highly desirable.
- Building channels for security coordination with member institutions not a priority for scientists and does not scale well.
- Managing the message is important ...

Incident Response

- Lessons learned from LHC (thanks Romain):
 - There is no such thing as a “small” incident once the media gets ahold of it.
 - Some scientists think they understand things they don’t and will talk about them freely to anyone who asks.
 - Governments and funding agencies will sometimes care more about perception than truth.

Current Status

- Much work left to be done on incident response both internally and coordinating with other organizations.
- One hurdle passed – major publicity for first detection in Feb, no incidents.
- CISO recently left to accept another position, we are looking if you are interested.